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CUTTING THROUGH: THIRTEEN WAYS OF
LOOKING AT JUSTICE STEVENS
ABNER S. GREENE*
1976. YoUNG V. AMERICAN MINI-THEI A TRES, INC.
Detroit imposes special zoning restrictions on adult movie theaters. "If
the theater is used to present 'material distinguished or characterized by an
emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to "Specified Sexual
Activities" or "Specified Anatomical Areas,"' it is an adult establishment." 2
This is broader than regulable obscenity, and clearly content-based. Can it
be saved'?
"The question whether speech is, or is not, protected by the First
Amendment often depends on the content of the speech," writes Justice
Stevens for a plurality.' He continues:
Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to
applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand
why our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few
of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the
citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the
theaters of our choice.'
True, no?
1978. FCC V. PACIFiCA FOUNDATION'
George Carlin's Filthy Words (or seven dirty words) routine was
broadcast on the radio, and the FCC issued a declaratory order to be
associated with the radio station's file. The language was patently offensive
and indecent and as such worthy of a demerit under federal law.
For a plurality, Justice Stevens again pulls no punches: "The order must
. fall if, as Pacifica argues, the First Amendment prohibits all
governmental regulation that depends on the content of speech. Our past
* leonard F. Manning Professor, Fordham University School of Law. I clerked for Justice
Stevens during the 1987 and 1988 Terms. Thanks to Greg Magarian for asking me to contribute to this
issue honoring a great Justice, American, and mentor.
I. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
2. Id. at 53.
3. Id. at 66.
4. Id. at 70.
5. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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cases demonstrate, however, that no such absolute rule is mandated by the
Constitution."" That much seemed clear, all of the low-value categories of
speech allow regulation based on content (subject to what we might call
categorical or definitional balancing tests). Since Carlin's words did not fit
within any recognized low-value category, the task for the Court was harder.
Two factors led to the plurality's conclusion that the administrative order
was constitutional: "the broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans";' and "broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. Although
Cohen's written message ["Fuck the Draft"]' might have been
incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged
a child's vocabulary in an instant."'
Despite contemporaneous and subsequent critique that this view played
too fast and loose with established First Amendment doctrine, the Pacifica
holding remains good law, and stands as an excellent example of Justice
Stevens' willingness to examine speech content, measure its value against
its harn, and engage in a common law judge's best trait, context-specific
reasoning.
1982. UNITED STA TS V. LEEl
For religious reasons, the Amish provide for their own elderly, and
believe they should be exempt from the social security tax and benefits
system. The Court majority declares, "The state may justify a limitation on
religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding
governmental interest."' The government interest in the social security
system is high, and "it would be difficult to accommodate the
comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from
a wide variety of religious beliefs." 2
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens agrees that the Free
Exercise Clause requires no exemption, but for a quite different reason. First
of all: "The Court overstates the magnitude of this risk because
the Amish claim applies only to a small religious community with an
6. Id. at 744.
7. Id. at 748.
8. Sec Cohen v. California. 403 1 .S. 15 (1971).
9. 438 U.S. at 749.
10. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
I1. Id. at 257.
12. Id. at 259 60.
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established welfare system of its own."' 3 Strict scrutiny isn't the right
standard here, maintains Justice Stevens. He writes:
[A] standard that places an almost insurmountable burden on any
individual who objects to a valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes) better explains
most of this Court's holdings than does the standard articulated by
the Court today. "
He adds:
[T]he principal reason for adopting a strong presumption against such
claims is not a matter of administrative convenience. It is the
overriding interest in keeping the government-whether it be the
legislature or the courts-out of the business of evaluating the
relative merits of differing religious claims. The risk that
governmental approval of some and disapproval of others will be
perceived as favoring one religion over another is an important risk
the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude."
Eight years later, in Emplovnent Division v. Smith,"m Justice Stevens'
position becomes the official view of the Court regarding Free Exercise
Clause exemptions.
1989. TEXAS V. JOINSON' 7
The Court holds 5-4 that the state may not criminally prosecute Gregory
Johnson for burning the American flag in public as an act of political protest.
At least it may not do so under Texas' "Desecration of a Venerated Object"
statute, which focuses the jury's attention on whether Johnson knew that his
action would seriously offend one or more persons.
Justice Stevens-Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy; Bronze
Star, codebreaking team-dissenting, would take this case out of standard
Free Speech Clause doctrinal analysis:
The question is unique. In my judgment rules that apply to a host of
other symbols, such as state flags, armbands, or various privately
13. Id. at 262.
14. Id. at 263 n.3.
15. Id. at 263 n.2.
16. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
17. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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promoted emblems of political or commercial identity, are not
necessarily controlling. Even if flag burning could be considered just
another species of symbolic speech under the logical application of
the rules that the Court has developed in its interpretation of the First
Amendment in other contexts, this case has an intangible dimension
that makes those rules inapplicable."
He doesn't have the votes here, nor in the next flag-burning case," but his
willingness to take on established First Amendment doctrine is profound.
1992. R.A. V. r. CirOF SIT PA UL2o
St. Paul, Minnesota, prohibits fighting words on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion, or gender.2 ' A clearly racially-motivated cross-burning
occurred, considered to come within the statute. The Court holds that the
statute unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of the subject matter of
the fighting words in question. At a key moment in his majority opinion,
Justice Scalia writes that the ordinance "does not fall within the exception
for content discrimination based on the very reasons why the particular class
of speech at issue (here, fighting words) is proscribable." 2 2
Concurring in the judgment (he agreed with Justice White that the
ordinance was overbroad, but disagreed with the majority that the limitation
to race-based and other fighting words was unconstitutional), Justice
Stevens, taking up an example offered by Justice Scalia in his "very
reasons" discussion, explains:
Just as Congress may determine that threats against the President
entail more severe consequences than other threats, so St. Paul's City
Council may determine that threats based on the target's race,
religion, or gender cause more severe harm to both the target and to
society than other threats. This latter judgment-that harms caused
by racial, religious, and gender-based invective are qualitatively
different from that caused by other fighting words-seems to me
eminently reasonable and realistic.2 3
18. Id. at 436.
19. See United States v. Eichman, 496 1.S. 310 (1990).
20. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
21. As the courts interpreted the complex statute. Id. at 380 (internal citations omitted).
22. Id. at 393.
23. Id. at 424.
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Similarly, says Justice Stevens, responding to another Scalia example,
"Certainly a legislature that may determine that the risk of fraud is greater
in the legal trade than in the medical trade may determine that the risk of
injury or breach of peace created by race-based threats is greater than that
created by other threats."24
Here Justice Stevens offers a kind of deference to the city in determining
whether certain types of fighting words needed regulating more than other
types. He refuses to adopt the suspicion of the majority opinion that the city
council was up to no good in drawing the lines it did.
1996. 44 LIQUORMART, INC. V. RHODE ISLAND 25
The Court invalidates Rhode Island's ban on truthful price advertising
for alcoholic beverages. This turns out to be a pretty easy case; in several
different opinions, the Justices agree that the state has various ways to
suppress alcohol consumption short of limiting truthful speech.
For a plurality only, Justice Stevens explains that the "greater includes
the lesser" manner of reasoning doesn't work here. The state argued that its
greater power to ban the sale of alcoholic beverages (under the Twenty-First
Amendment) means that it also has the lesser power to permit such sale, but
ban price advertising. Justice Stevens would have none of this:
Although we do not dispute the proposition that greater powers
include lesser ones, we fail to see how that syllogism requires the
conclusion that the State's power to regulate commercial activity is
"greater" than its power to ban truthful, nonmisleading
commercial speech. . . . [W]e think it quite clear that banning speech
may sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct. As a
venerable proverb teaches, it may prove more injurious to prevent
people from teaching others how to fish than to prevent fish from
being sold. Similarly, a local ordinance banning bicycle lessons may
curtail freedom far more than one that prohibits bicycle riding within
city limits. In short, we reject the assumption that words are
necessarily less vital to freedom than actions, or that logic somehow
proves that the power to prohibit an activity is necessarily "greater"
than the power to suppress speech about it.2 6
24. Id. at 424-25.
25. 517 U.S.484(1996).
26. Id. at 511.
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1997. RENO V. A CL U27
Here's Justice Stevens, for the Court, leading off the opinion:
At issue is the constitutionality of two statutory provisions enacted to
protect minors from "indecent" and "patently offensive"
communications on the Internet. Notwithstanding the legitimacy and
importance of the congressional goal of protecting children from
harmful materials, we agree with the three-judge District Court that
the statute abridges "the freedom of speech" protected by the First
Amendment.
This is a complex case, the first in which the Court addresses sexual speech
on the internet and potential harm to children. And even though the Court's
awareness of the internet is still in its infancy, Justice Stevens sees the
future:
[T]he Internet can hardly be considered a "scarce" expressive
commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for
communication of all kinds.... This dynamic, multifaceted category
of communication includes not only traditional print and news
services, but also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive,
real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a
phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther
than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail
exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a
pamphleteer.
And in the conclusion, Justice Stevens writes:
The record demonstrates that the growth of the Internet has been and
continues to be phenomenal. As a matter of constitutional tradition,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that
governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The
interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society
outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship."'
27. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
28. Id. at 849.
29. Id. at 870.
30. Id. at 885.
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2000. Cayv oF ERIE V. PAP's AM. 1
The city bans intentionally or knowingly appearing in public in a state
of nudity. Both the preamble to the ordinance and other legislative history
clearly reveal the purpose of the law is to eliminate nude dancing at strip
clubs. Justice O'Connor's plurality deems this an O'Brien3 2 case, applying
that case's test for incidental restrictions on expression, but instead of
examining the law's general purpose (which is the norm for O'Brien
analysis), she examines the purpose as-applied to nude dancing at strip
clubs,3 3 and upholds the law on the secondary effects rationale developed
by Justice Stevens in Young.3 4
In dissent, Justice Stevens challenges the core doctrinal moves in Justice
O'Connor's opinion:
Far more important than the question whether nude dancing is
entitled to the protection of the First Amendment are the dramatic
changes in legal doctrine that the Court endorses today. Until now,
the "secondary effects" of commercial enterprises featuring indecent
entertainment have justified only the regulation of their location. For
the first time, the Court has now held that such effects may justify the
total suppression of protected speech. Indeed, the plurality opinion
concludes that admittedly trivial advancements of a State's interests
may provide the basis for censorship.3 5
The plurality cannot have its cake and eat it too-either Erie's
ordinance was not aimed at speech and the plurality may attempt to
justify the regulation under the incidental burdens test, or Erie has
aimed its law at the secondary effects of speech, and the plurality can
try to justify the law under that doctrine. But it cannot conflate the
two with the expectation that Erie's interests aimed at secondary
effects will be rendered unrelated to speech by virtue of this doctrinal
polyglot.31
31. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
32. United States v. (Brien. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
33. Id. at 289 90.
34. Id. at 294.
35. 529 U.S. at 317 18.
36. Id. at 326.
2017]1 1435
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
2000. SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SClio0L DISnRI'T I'. DOE3n
The local public school board authorizes high school students to vote to
designate students to deliver invocations at varsity football games. Under
Court precedent, two issues are relevant: Is the state behind the push for
prayer, or is this student initiated? If there is sufficient state action, are
students psychologically coerced to participate in the relevant prayer
activity?
After engaging in careful analysis of the history behind this particular
practice, Justice Stevens (for a 6-3 majority) concludes, on question one:
"The delivery of such a message-over the school's public address system,
by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of school
faculty, and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly
encourages public prayer-is not properly characterized as 'private'
speech.""
And on the second question, here's Justice Stevens:
The District . . . minimizes the importance to many students of
attending and participating in extracurricular activities as part of a
complete educational experience. . . . .. [L]aw reaches past
formalism." To assert that high school students do not feel immense
social pressure, or have a truly genuine desire, to be involved in the
extracurricular event that is American high school football is
"39
"formalistic in the extreme.
It would have been easy enough for the Court to distinguish its precedent
on prayer in elementary school classrooms, and for high school graduation,
but that would have failed to recognize the legal relevance of the social facts
regarding high school football games in many parts of the United States.
2000. BoYSScouTs v. DAL/40
New Jersey law forbids places of public accommodation from
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation (inter alia). The state court
deems the Boy Scouts covered by the law, and holds that the Scouts violated
the law by dismissing an openly gay assistant scoutmaster because of his
sexual orientation. The Supreme Court, 5-4, holds that this application of
37. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
38. Id. at 310.
39. Id. at 3 II (internal citations omitted).
40. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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state law violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment (unenumerated) right
of expressive association. Key to the Court's holding is this: "Dale's
presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization
to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy
Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior." 4 '
This is a complex case; perhaps any kind of compelled membership in a
noncommercial organization should constitute a presumptive violation of
the freedom of association; whether we should call that intimate or
expressive association, in settings such as the Boy Scouts, is a tricky
question. The Court treats this as an expressive (not intimate) association
case; and focuses not on the ways in which compelled membership might
be thought to intrinsically risk affecting the organization's idea and identity
formation, but rather on whether Dale's "presence" per state law would
"send a message." On that, Justice Stevens has this to say, in dissent: "His
participation sends no cognizable message to the Scouts or to the world...
Dale did not carry a banner or a sign; he did not distribute any fact sheet;
and he expressed no intent to send any message." Justice Stevens adds:
It is . . . farfetched to assert that Dale's open declaration of his
homosexuality, reported in a local newspaper, will effectively force
BSA to send a message to anyone simply because it allows Dale to
be an Assistant Scoutmaster. For an Olympic gold medal winner or a
Wimbledon tennis champion, being 'openly gay' perhaps
communicates a message-for example, that openness about one's
sexual orientation is more virtuous than concealment; that a
homosexual person can be a capable and virtuous person who should
be judged like anyone else; and that homosexuality is not immoral-
but it certainly does not follow that they necessarily send a message
on behalf of the organizations that sponsor the activities in which they
excel.4 3
41. Id. at 653.
42. Id. at 694-95.
43. Id. at 697.
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2005. VAN ORDEN I'. PERRY 4 4
On the same day, the Court strikes down a Ten Commandments display
on a Kentucky courthouse wall and upholds a Ten Commandments
monument on Texas state capitol grounds. Justice Breyer is the swing vote.
The state capitol grounds host 17 monuments and 21 historical markers,
none challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause except the one in
question here. The Ten Commandments monument displays the language
of the commandments, some of which are explicitly religious or theistic.
For Justice Stevens, dissenting, this is an easy case. "In my judgment, at
the very least, the Establishment Clause has created a strong presumption
against the display of religious symbols on public property."" A public-
private line is critical here (as it was in the Santa Fe case, where solely
student-sponsored prayer would have been fine):
For those of us who learned to recite the King James version of the
text long before we understood the meaning of some of its words,
God's Commandments may seem like wise counsel. The question
before this Court, however, is whether it is counsel that the State of
Texas may proclaim without violating the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution.
At least on these facts, the answer seems obvious:
Viewed on its face, Texas' display has no purported connection to
God's role in the formation of Texas or the founding of our Nation;
nor does it provide the reasonable observer with any basis to guess
that it was erected to honor any individual or organization. The
message transmitted by Texas' chosen display is quite plain: This
State endorses the divine code of the "Judeo-Christian" God.4 7
A different kind of setting, or a clearly private display, would have yielded
a different result, even for Justice Stevens, an ardent anti-establishment
Justice. But here he sees a Ten Commandments monument, with its clearly
religious/theistic language, in a prominent state capitol grounds setting, not
cured by the fact that other secular monuments and markers are also
scattered throughout the grounds.
44. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
45. Id. at 708.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 707.
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2010. CTIZENS UNIn1 v. FEC4 1
The Court, 5-4, strikes down federal restrictions on corporate
independent expenditures in candidate elections.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, writes:
In the context of election to public office, the distinction between
corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they make
enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually
members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may
be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may
conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters.
The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation
of corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the
electoral process. Our lawmakers have a compelling constitutional
basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take measures designed to
guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending
in local and national races."
At bottom, the Court's opinion is thus a rejection of the common
sense of the American people, who have recognized a need to prevent
corporations from undermining self-government since the founding,
and who have fought against the distinctive corrupting potential of
corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. It is
a strange time to repudiate that common sense. While American
democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this Court would
have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in
politics."'
In later writing,5 ' Justice Stevens argues for amending the Constitution to
overturn Citizens United.
2010. CIHISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTNEZ 2
Hastings Law School, a state school, officially recognizes and funds
student groups only if they allow all students to be members and run for
48. 558 tl.S. 310 (2010).
49. Id. at 394.
50. Id. at 479.
51. JOHN PAtul. SliVV NS. Six AMINDMENTS: Iow AND WIlY WiE Stl 1ou 0 ('HAN6I. 1TI1
CONSTITION (2014).
52. 561 i S. 061 (2010).
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leadership positions. The Christian Legal Society (CLS) can't abide by this
for openly gay and lesbian students. So Hastings won't recognize or fund
CLS. The Court holds the School's registered students organization (RSO)
program a limited public forum, and its "all comers" policy viewpoint
neutral and reasonable.
For Justice Stevens, concurring, the case is better seen through the
government as educator/government speech lens than through the limited
public forum lens. He writes:
Having exercised its discretion to establish an RSO program, a
university must treat all participants evenhandedly. But the university
need not remain neutral-indeed it could not remain neutral-in
determining which goals the program will serve and which rules are
best suited to facilitate those goals. These are not legal questions but
policy questions; they are not for the Court but for the university to
make. 3
He adds, "A free society must tolerate . . . groups [that discriminate on
various grounds]. It need not subsidize them, give them its official
imprimatur, or grant them equal access to law school facilities."
Surely this is the more accurate lens, is it not'?
53. Id. at 702.
54. Id. at 703.
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